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Abstract
As WiFi becomes increasingly popular, CSI-based attack has attracted much attention , which uses channel state
information (CSI) of public Wi-Fi to exploit the strong correlation between the CSI fluctuation and the pattern lock or
keystrokes to infer the user’s input. Obviously, this new attack form can obtain the gesture privacy more far away from
target and without any displayed information on the screen, so past proposals will perform poorly in the new attack
scenarios.
To defeat CSI-based attack, we propose a protection system WiGuard. Unlike prior work that considers channel
interference as a harmful effect to avoid, our design exploits channel interference to protect gesture sensitive
information. The intuition underlying our design is that we can interfere the attacker’s wireless transmitter to distort
the CSI signal. We explore a simple but functional hop channel solution to increase the packet loss of CSI channel,
our approach automatically detects when a CSI-based attack happens, and it also determines where to place a
safe wireless transmitter to introduce interference without greatly affecting normal network traffics. We evaluated
our approach by applying it to protect the user’s pattern lock on mobile phones and the keystroke records of pc.
Experimental results show that our approach is able to reduce the success rate of CSI-based attack from 92%to 42%
for single keystrokes and from 82.33% to 21.67% for unlock patterns.
Keywords
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Introduction
Smartphones and tables are usually used in public
places (such as cafes, hotels, shopping malls, airports,
etc.) and connected to the public WiFi. However, in such
an environment, using mobile devices, by analyzing the
influence of user’s fingertip movement on the channel state
information (CSI) of WIFI signals when they enter the
password, we can open the back door for attackers who can
steal user passwords.We call this kind of attack as “CSI-
based attack”.
Unlike traditional shoulder surfing attack uses direct
observation techniques, looking over someone’s shoulder, to
get information such as passwords, PINs, security codes, and
similar data oxf (2007). CSI-based attack can recognize the
users’ gesture privacy (PIN, Pattern Lock, Keystrokes etc.)
only by one Public Wi-Fi AP Ali et al. (2015), but not need
to use any other vision-enhancing devices in long distance.
Moreover, using Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) such as
NICs 5300, the adversaries can commit a successfully attack
to get your pattern lock Zhang et al. (2016) even without
obtaining any information displayed on themishra:weighted
screen. Worst of all, with professional techniques such like
MIMO beamforming Wang et al. (2014), the more fine-
grained CSI of mouth motions could leakage your whipers.
As shown in Figure 1, to launch the new attack called
CSI-based attack, there is only just one thing needed, and
it is that the attacker toolkits and the target devices access
the same online public WiFi simultaneously. Unfortunately,
these things almost happen all the time in KFC, Modoload,
or StarBack Coffee Bar, etc.
So what is the rationale that goes behind making these
CSI-based attack so easy for attackers? The key sight of
these attacks is that CSI characterizes the channel frequency
response, and the signal at the receiver end is a superposition
of multipath propagation, which the multipath comes from
the wall and the surrounding objects. When a user performs
1School of Information Science and Technology, Northwest University,
Xi’an, P.R. China




∗Extension of Conference Paper: a preliminary version of this article
entitled “Protect Sensitive Information Against Channel State Information
Based Attacks” by J. Zhang et el. appeared in International Conference on
Computational Science and Engineering(CSE), 2017 Zhang et al. (2017).
The extended version makes the following additional contributions over
the conference paper: (1)it provides a more detailed description of the
attack; (2) it describes how the user use WiGuard to protect sensitive
information and give the user a choice for position and channel to optimize
the system performance; (3) it provides new experimental results to evaluate
the influence of packet loss rate on success rate and provides proof for
channel switch; (4) it adds a new experiment to evaluate the diversity of
the attacker wireless transmitter; (5)it includes new results to compare the
recognition results with and without channel interference.
Prepared using sagej.cls [Version: 2016/06/24 v1.10]
















Figure 1. Attack Scenarios. The target is doing gesture privacy in public place, and the attacker receives the gesture-related CSI
values using NICs in scenario 1 and scenario 4 while in scenario 2 and scenario 3, the attacker using her laptop to receive the
gesture-related CSI values.
different gestures, the multipath for different gestures will be
different, thus different gestures will generate their unique
patterns in time-series CSI values.
However, it is not enough to simply obtaining CSI values,
the fine-grained of CSI is reuqired to commit a CSI-based
attack well. In order to capture the subtle differences between
gestures, the CSI must be measured at a fine-grained level.
This is often done by sending high-frequent ICMP packets
to the target AP† to obtain a high frequent sample rate by
analyzing the response packets sent by the target AP. For
instance, the work presented in Ali et al. (2015) requires the
attacker to send at least 2500 ICMP packets per second to the
target AP. Therefore, obtaining high-frequent, fine-grained
CSI measurements is key to the success of CSI-based attacks.
As analyzed above, the more fine-grained the CSI is, the
easier the attacker will obtain gesture privacy. For users to
protect their gesture privacy, inspired by Rouf et al. (2012),
the user can reduce the rate of the ICMP ping packets
or make the attacker’s receiver lose ICMP ping packets,
a low ICMP ping packets cannot capture the difference
details between different gestures, and the attacker will not
decode the gestures successfully. While there are a number
of methods available to drop ICMP responses Wikipedia
(2016), the communication quality of the target device
cannot be ignored. Our approach to this issue is to exploit
the fact that the communication quality of the target AP will
decrease if there exists another AP uses a channel next to the
target APs working channel.
This paper introduces WiGuard, unlike prior work Qiao
et al. (2016), which proposes a black sensor obfuscation
technique, needs additional hardwares, WiGuard explores
the potential of adjacent channel interference to defeat the
CSI-based attack and prevent public WiFi from leaking
users’ gesture privacy. In order to do so, knowing which
public WiFi is being leveraged to obtain CSI values by
an attacker is an important first step for an user to take
measures of protection. Simply put, if the network activity is
normal without suspicious CSI collection in public WiFi, the
users could use their wireless network normally; otherwise
the users need to detect which channel the target public
AP works on, then switch a safe wireless transmitter (as
described in section ) to a proper channel to interfere the
target public AP. All in an effort is to make the wireless
receiver end to lose massive key packets of CSI data, so that
the attackers can’t recover the corresponding gesture privacy
signals correctly.
To reduce the impact to the user, our approach
automatically detects when an attack is likely to happen by
monitoring the network activities, and only switches on the
protected scheme if an attack is detected. Different from
past approaches Xu et al. (2011) Villegas et al. (2007),
which consider channel interference as detrimental and seeks
reasonable channel assignment method to avoid channel
interference Mishra et al. (2005) Lee et al. (2002) Akl
and Arepally (2007) Akella et al. (2007). WiGuard exploits
channel interference to prevent wireless signals from leaking
users’ privacy. To transform the above idea into a practical,
feasible system, we need to solve the following challenges:
(1) When the users access the public WiFi, how do they
know whether there exists an attacker in current public WiFi?
From the CSI-based keystrokes recognition Ali et al. (2015),
we know that the receiver needs to continuously pings the
wireless transmitter at a high rate, such as 2500 packets
per second, and the user can monitor the number of ICMP
packets in the network to decide whether there exist attacks
in the public place.
(2) How to increase the packet loss of CSI channel so as
to distort the corresponding gesture privacy signals obtained
by attackers, while does not affect the public WiFi network
to correspond normally? After detecting the channel of
public wireless transmitter, the channel of a safe wireless
transmitter is switched to interfere the attacker’s obtained
wireless signals. However, there are many adjacent channels
that can be switched to interfere the attacker. For example,
when the target public AP is 6, the safe wireless transmitter
can switch to channel 4 or channel 5, which channel should
the safe wireless transmitter switch so that the channel
interference between the safe wireless transmitter and the
target public AP can achieve the maximum meanwhile the
normal users’ network services on the target public AP are
not affected by the channel interference.
(3) How can we choose a proper distance for safe
wireless transmitter, and from this distance,there will not
exist adjacent channel interference between the safe wireless
transmitter and other normal APs? There may exist many
public APs in the public places, if the distance between
the safe wireless transmitter and the normal APs is short,
then the channel switch of the safe wireless transmitter
†We define the public AP that the attacker leverages as target public AP.
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may interfere the normal public APs‡. If the safe wireless
transmitters are far away from the normal public APs, then
the channel switch of the safe wireless transmitter will not
influence the normal public APs. Thus, we propose a CSI-
based localization method for pubic APs and based on the
localization results, the system will give a proper position
if the user choose their smart devices as the safe wireless
transmitter; if the user choose the normal public AP as the
safe wireless transmitter, the system will give a choice of
normal public AP.
Summary of Results: We built a prototype of WiGuard
and evaluated it in different conditions. Our extensive
experiments lead to the following findings:
• In order to interfere the attacker’s received packets, the
channel spacing between safe wireless transmitter and
the target public AP is 1, which can interfere the target
public AP to the greatest extent.
• in order not to interfere the other normal public APs,
the distance between the safe wireless transmitter and
the normal public APs should be less tan 4m.
• The paper demonstrates that channel interference can
defeat CSI-based attack by recovering the unlock
patterns for smart phone and the keyboards of pc.
The recovery accuracy of them are separately 82.33%
and 92% when there exists no channel interference;
when there exists channel interference, the recovery
accuracy of them are separately 21.67% and 42%.
Contributions: This paper makes the following contribu-
tions:
• It analyzes the essence of CSI-based surfing attack and
introduces a protection system to defeat it. To the best
of our knowledge, we are the first to propose solutions
for such an attack.
• It presents a channel interference protection system
that exploits channel interference to defeat CSI-
based attack. As a result, the design delivers good
protective effect and the success rate of CSI-based
attack decreases dramatically.
• It is a working system and evaluates it in real-word
environment. The results demonstrate that the system
doesn’t influence the normal network service.
Background
Threat Model
A scenario is considered where attackers try to identify
user’s gesture privacy in a series of time series CSI values
generated by user gestures, and attackers do not need to be
close to users or on user screens. We assume that an attacker
can access public WiFi at a high rate of Ping public WiFi AP
and use a receiver to receive the time series CSI value. Two
representative scenarios the attack is reasonable are: (1) the
receiving end of attackers in public places is not obvious to
be ready (for example NIC) in public places, or in the hidden
settings receiver suspicious; (2) the attackers pretend to use
his laptop to work in a public place, he looks normal.
For scenario 1, as shown in Figure 1a, the user unlocks the
device while the attacker uses the network NICs to receive










Figure 2. The process of CSI-based attack. When the attacker
obtains the CSI values of gesture privacy, after noise removal,
feature extraction, the attacker will decode the gesture
successfully.
prepared network NICs stays near the user. However, the
location of the network NICs is hidden, and the user does
not notice the receiver. For scenario 2, as shown in Figure
1b, an attacker pretends to work on a laptop computer used
to receive CSI values. The attacker looks normal so that the
user won’t perceive him/her.
CSI-based Attack
With more and more public places deploying public WiFi,
CSI has received much attention Xiao et al. (2013) Abdel-
Nasser et al. (2013), and because of rich information that
CSI contains, it can be used to detect micro motions, such
as finger motions Ali et al. (2015) Zhang et al. (2016)
and mouth motions Wang et al. (2014).Using a commercial
receiver, an attacker can obtain a user’s PIN, password, or
other gesture information for gestures. In this section, we
first show why CSI can detect and restore gesture privacy,
and then will introduce a novel attack, CSI-based attack.
Overview of CSI
Channel state information(CSI) contains fine-grained
information of wireless signals and it is the characterization
of variations in the wireless channel and it can be
obtained by WiFi network interface controllers (NICs). Let
NTx represents the number of transmitting antennas, NRx
represents the number of receiving antennas, what received
at the receiver end will be 30×NTx ×NRx CSI streams,
which 30 means there are 30 subcarriers for a received
packet.
CSI-based Gesture Privacy Recovery Model
The CSI value can be used to restore gesture privacy
.movement from a particular part of the body will introduce
relative multi-path propagation of the wireless signal
when the user is gesturing privacy,and different motions
correspond to different multi-path propagation, therefore a
‡Definition 1: When two wireless transmitters are in the certain range of
distance, if they work on the adjacent channels, there will exist channel
interference between them and we call the two wireless transmitters
neighbors and the distance ca be called Dneighbor ; however, when the
distance between them is greater than Dneighbor , the channel interference
will not occur even when they work on adjacent channels.
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unique pattern will be generated in the sequence CSI value
by a certain motion, and the uniqueness can be used to restore
the privacy of the gesture.
For the CSI-based gesture privacy recovery model, several
steps are required to successfully identify. First, noise needs
to be removed from the signal obtained. After noise removal,
it is necessary to extract the actual affected part of the signal
track from the collected signal, and then use the gesture
recovery methods to restore the gesture privacy, as shown
in Figure 2.
1)Noise Removal
The CSI values received by commercial WiFi NICs
usually contain inherent noise, such as Gaussian white noise,
because the transmission rates and internal CSI inference
levels change frequently. In order to use CSI values to
recover gesture privacy, such inherent noise need to be
removed from CSI time-series values.
There are many methods for CSI-based gesture privacy
recovery system to remove noise, such as MIMO beamform-
ing or directional antennas to focus on the certain parts of
the body, discrete wavelet decomposition to remove noise, a
low-pass filter to remove high frequency noise, and so on.
2) Feature Extraction
The CSI values usually start to be collected before the
gestures start and end to be collected after the gestures end.
So, after removing noise from obtained signals, the actual
influenced signal traces need to be extracted from time-series
CSI values.
When the gesture starts, the CSI waveforms will show
a similar rising or falling tends. Thus, a simple method,
sliding window, can be used to extract the features. However,
the gestures that users always do can be classified into
two categories, one is consecutive gestures, and another is
discrete gestures. For consecutive gestures, there exists no
pause in gestures performing process, such as unlock patterns
on Android screen and applications; while for discrete
gestures, there exists pause in gesture performing process,
such as keystrokes of laptops or digital unlock passwords.
For discrete gestures, the system first segments the time-
series CSI values into individual motions, then extract the
features for each individual motion.
After making sure the starting and ending point, for each
gesture, Pricipal Component Analysis (PCA) method can be
used to extract the signals that only contain variations caused
by the certain gestures on the filtered subcarriers so that even
for similar gestures, the extracted features are also different
and the system can get a high recovery accuracy for those
similar gestures.
3) Gesture Privacy Signal Recovery
After extracting features, gesture privacy recovery
methods will be applied to recover gestures. There exists
similarity between speech recognition and gesture recovery,
thus, a well-established technique, Dynamic time warping
(DTW) that borrowed from speech recognition can be used
to recover the gesture privacy.
DTW calculates the distance between the two waveforms
and the shorter the distance is, the more similar the two
waveforms will be. A hierarchical approach can be used
to reduce the computational complexity and computational
cost, or the DTW distance can be used as the input and the
system will train a classifiers using the distance and all those
gesture features. Then the system will recover the gestures
from each classifier.
CSI-based Attack
Shoulder surfing attack, which the attacker obtain the
users’ passwords by direct observation or by recording
the user’s authentication session, is a known risk and a
special concern when people input their personal privacy
information in public places Wiedenbeck et al. (2006). The
user’s defense is to shield the screen with an object or
his/her body. However, in public places, the attacker can
obtain your gesture privacy information through public WiFi
instead of direct observation and it is called CSI-based
attack. Unlike traditional shoulder surfing attack, the attacker
doesn’t observe the user’s screen directly, as shown in Figure
1, the attacker is far away from the user and doesn’t need
to have control of the user’s screen. Qiao et al. Qiao et al.
(2016) also demonstrate that gesture privacy can be obtained
by using WiFi signals.
The implementation of CSI-based atatck only needs a
receiver for attacker, and the receiver can be a network NICs
or laptop, all the devices are commercial off-the-self (COTS)
devices, thus it can be easily achieved and deployed by an
axe-grinding attacker. Because the attacker does not need to
be near to the user or obtain any displayed information on
the screen, so the attacker can mingle in the crowd and looks
unsuspicious, as shown in Figure 1.
After obtaining the wireless signals associated with
gesture privacy, the gestures can be decoded successfully by
the attacker using noise removal, feature chosen and gesture
recognition techniques, as shown in Figure 2. In order to
achieve CSI-based attack, there are several requirements that
the attacker successfully decode the gesture privacy,which
can be equivalent to the following equation:
CSI-based Attack ⇔ (Wireless Transmitter, Signal
Receiver, ICMP ping packets at a high rate from transmitter,
Communication Channel between Transmitter and Receiver,
QualityCSI )
The specific understanding of the above equation is as
follows: there must be a wireless transmitter and a signal
receiver. The wireless transmitter is used to transmit the
wireless signal, and the signal receiver is used to receive the
time-series CSI values . In order to characterize the fine-
grained degree of different gestures, especially for those
similar gestures, the ICMP Ping packets from the emitter
must be at a very high speed. In addition, the communication
channel between the transmitter and the receiver must remain
stable. Once the communication channel is disturbed and
unstable, the receiver will not receive the ICMP Ping packet
from the sending side, which will lead to incomplete the
time-series CSI values. QualityCSI describes the quality
of received time-series CSI values, if the wireless signal
interference in multi-path propagation,it will be changed
when it reaches the receiving end, and the received time-
series CSI values will be different, this will cause the CSI
waveform distortion.
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WiGuard Overview
Channel Interference
The IEEE 802.11 is widely used for public WiFi and it
usually works on 2.4 GHz, which is between 2400 MHz and
2500 MHz. 2.4 GHz is divided into 13 frequency bands§
Draft (2003), and each frequency band is 22 MHz. However,
there are 13 channels in 100 MHz frequency band. That
will lead to more or less overlaps between frequency bands
and the overlaps between frequency band will cause channel
interference.
However, when the cental frequency spacing of two
frequency bands is more than 22MHz, there will exist no
channel interference between these two frequency bands.
Generally, channel 1, channel 6 and channel 11 are chosen
to be used simultaneously. Besides channel 1, channel 6 and
channel 11, if the devices support, there are other two groups
of channels that doesn’t interfere with each other, and they
are channel 2, channel 7, channel 12; channel 3, channel 8
and channel 13. For 13 channels, there are 4 channels that
are overlapped with the same channel. Thus, if an AP uses
a ceratin channel, its neighbor AP must use one channel of
the remaining unoverlapped 8 channels, otherwise, there will
exist channel interference between these two neighbor APs.
Furthermore, among the overlapped 4 channels, the
channel interference is different between the two neighbor
APs when the channel spacing between them is different,
because the overlaps between the two channels are different.
For example, the overlaps between channel 2 and channel 1
is 77.27% while the overlaps between channel 3 and channel
1 is 54.55%. Thus, the channel interference between channel
2 and channel 1 is different from that between channel 3 and
channel 1.
Prior researches have also demonstrated that adjacent
channel is harmful Angelakis et al. (2011) Zubow and
Sombrutzki (2012) in 802.11 network, Akella et al. Akella
et al. (2007) validate that when there are a plenty of wireless
transmitters in a region, the co-channel interference will
greatly reduce the network output and the output of TCP
reduces from 9Mbps to 2Mbps, the output of UDP also
reduces and it reduces from 9.7Mbps to 8.6Mbps. In order
to keep the neighbor wireless transmitters non-interfering
with each other, there are many channel assignment methods
proposed for WLANs Mishra et al. (2005) Lee et al. (2002)
Chieochan et al. (2010) Akl and Arepally (2007).
System Overview
In order to resist the CSI-based attack, a protection
system WiGuard is designed which destroys the QualityCSI
with channel interference,and is a necessary condition for
the success of the CSI-based attack. In this section, we
introduce the system design. First, ICMP based Attacker AP
Acquirement detects whether there are abnormal ICMP Ping
packets caused by the CSI value collected by an attacker. So,
if there is no abnormal ICMP Ping packet, the user can do
their gestures; instead, if it exists, the user should detect the
target public AP work in which channel,and then switch the
channel of a safe wireless transmitter to a proper channel to
interfere with the attacker, as shown in Figure 3.
Input-Output
Public WiFi

































Figure 3. System overview.
Attacker AP Detection
Attacker AP Characteristics
In order to successfully decode the users’ gesture privacy
information, the attacker should have a fine-grained CSI
values. Coarse-grained CSI values can’t characterize the
difference between gestures, especially for those micro
motions, such as digital unlock passwords of smart phones,
keystrokes of laptops. However, CSI values are measured
on ICMP ping packets. Thus, in order to obtain fine-grained
CSI values, the attacker’s receiver needs to continuously ping
packets from public AP at a high rate, such as in order
to decode the keystrokes of laptops successfully, the rate
of ICMP ping packets should be 2500 packets/s Ali et al.
(2015).
In normal cases, ICMP ping packets occur to test the
network connectivity and ICMP ping packets are sent at the
rate of one packet per second Sin et al. (2002). So, generally,
there exist no ICMP ping packets or few ICMP ping packets
for public AP. When an attacker leverages the public AP to
collect CSI values, the attacker’s receiver will continuously
ping packets from public AP at a high rate, and there will
exist plenty of ICMP ping packets in the network.
Attacker AP Detection
Based on the analysis mentioned above, xxxx , whether
there exist ICMP ping packets and the number of ICMP ping
packets per unit of time can be used to detect whether the
public AP is leveraged by the attacker to collect CSI values.
If a public AP is detected to exist plenty of ICMP ping
packets during different time periods, then it is very likely
caused by an attacker who is pinging the public AP st a high
rate, and we think there exist an attack in the public place.
However, generally in public places, there is not only one
public AP, an attacker may use two or more public APs to
improve the CSI-based attacks success rate, Abdelnasser et
al. Abdelnasser et al. (2015) demonstrated using multiple
APs can improve the accuracy of recovery. Thus, in public
§In this paper, only channel 1 to channel 13 are considered just because the
channel 14 is only used in Japan and only 802.11b can support the channel
14 in Japan.
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places, attackers can use more public APs, not just one public
AP to decode gestures privacy successfully. Therefore, in
order to ensure that attackers don’t use all potential public
AP to collect CSI values, users need to surf all public APs to
detect how many public APs the attacker used.
When the user detects an abnormal ICMP Ping packet
in the current network, the system will first detect which
channel the target public network AP is working on.
Channel detection is easy to implement, and there are many
commercial applications that can support channel detection
functions, such as WiFi analyzer.
Adjacent Channel Interference
After detecting the channel that the target public APs work
on, adjacent channel interference will be used to protect the
user’s gesture privacy. However, how should the channel
of a safe wireless transmitter change when the number of
target public APs is different? Which channel should the safe
wireless transmitter switch so that the packet loss rate caused
by channel interference is the maximum? Then we will give
details of adjacent channel interference protection method.
Safe Wireless Transmitter
In order to interfere the channel of the target public APs,
the channel of a safe wireless transmitter need to be switched.
The safe wireless transmitter can be the normal public APs in
the public place. The user can also use his/her devices with
hotspot functionality as the safe wireless transmitters, such
as his/her smartphones or laptops. When the public wireless
network is detected to be abnormal, the hotspot functionality
of the user’s devices can be turned on, and then the channel
of users’ devices will be switched to interfere the attacker.
Channel Switch
After detecting the channels, a safe wireless transmitter
will switch its channel to interfere the attacker. However,
there are four adjacent channels that can interfere the same
channel, from the above analysis in section , we know
that when the channel spacing between two neighbor APs
is different, the channel interference between them is also
different, thus the packet loss rate that caused by the channel
interference will also be different, so which channel should
the safe wireless transmitter switch to interfere the attacker
so that the packet rate loss will be the maximum?
Theoretically, when the channel spacing between two
adjacent AP is 1, the channel interference between the two
channels is the largest, because the overlap between the two
channels is the largest. Therefore, switching the safe wireless
transmitter to the adjacent channel can achieve the purpose
of jamming the attacker. The channel spacing between the
secure wireless transmitter and the target public AP is 1.
However, in most cases, attackers can use two or more
public APs to collect CSI values in order to improve the
success rate. How the secure wireless transmitter switch
channel to interfere with all the target public APs.There
are two cases considered here. One is the secure wireless
transmitter only needs to switch to the right channel. The
other is the secure wireless transmitter needs to switch
between two channels to interfere all the target public APs,
so as to prevent attackers from acquiring CSI values.
(a) Switch to a proper channel
When the channel of the secure wireless transmitter
switches to the appropriate channel, the CSI signals that
the attacker receives will lose the packets in two different
cases. In the first case, the public places have only one
target public AP, the channel of wireless transmitter can
be switched to a adjacent channel, for example,when the
target public AP is working on channel 6, users will
be able to switch the channel of the secure wireless
transmitter to channel 5 or channel 7. In another case,
when the public places have two or more public APs,
and the channel spacing of all target public APs is less
than 5, the channel of the secure wireless transmitter
can be switched to the right channel to interfere with
attackers, for example,the channels of two target public
APs are channel 1 and channel 6, then the secure wireless
transmitter can switch to channel 3 or channel 4.
In the second case, we can switch the secure wireless
transmitter to the appropriate channel to interfere with
the attacker, but in order to maximize the packet loss rate,
we can switch the secure wireless transmitter between
the two channels.
(b) Switch between two channels
If the channel interval between the target public AP is
greater than 5, the secure wireless transmitter can switch
between the two channels to achieve interference. For
example, when there are abnormal network activities
detected in two public APs, and the channels of the
two target public APs are channel 1 and channel 11
respectively, then the secure wireless transmitter needs
to switch between channel 2 and channel 10.
System Performance Optimization
When channel interference protection method is used
to protection users’ gesture privacy, in order not to affect
the normal communication of public wireless network, the
system need to be optimized from two folds: in one hand,
after switching the channel of the safe wireless transmitter,
it should not affect the normal network service of the target
public APs so that the network service of the people who
have already accessed the target public WiFi is not affected.
In another hand, there should exist no channel interference
between the safe wireless transmitter and the normal public
wireless transmitters.
The strength of channel interference between two
neighbor wireless transmitters comes from the distance
between them and the channel spacing between their
channel. The smaller channel spacing is, the stronger the
channel interference between those two wireless transmitters
will be. However, when the two wireless transmitters are far
away from each other, even when they work on adjacent
channel, there will not exist channel interference between
them.
From the analysis above, the safe wireless transmitter
can be set to be far away from normal public wireless
transmitters and to be near to the target public APs, so that
after switching the channel of the safe wireless transmitter,
the channel interference will not exist between the former
and it will only exist between the latter. Thus, we need to
localize the distance between the safe wireless transmitters
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Figure 4. Interference vector
and all the public wireless transmitters,and then after the
localization, the system will give a proper position for the
safe wireless transmitters when the user uses his own devices
as the safe wireless transmitters, or the system will give a
proper choice for the safe wireless transmitters from all those
normal wireless transmitters.
System Optimization Model
Based on the analysis above, the strength of channel
interference can be mapped into a function f(d,channel),
then a optimization model is built for the system. As shown
in Figure 4, the channel interference can be mapped into
two vectors, min vector and max vector, which min vector
represents the channel interference between the safe wireless
transmitter and the normal public wireless transmitters while
max vector represents the channel interference between the
safe wireless transmitter and the target public APs.
In order not to interfere the normal public wireless
transmitters, min vector will give a proper position where
the safe wireless transmitter is not the neighbor of normal
wireless transmitters and is the neighbor of the target public
AP. In order not to affect the normal network service of target
public AP, max vector will give a proper channel which after
the safe wireless transmitter switches to the channel, the
channel interference between the safe wireless transmitters
and the target public APs is the strongest, and the packet
loss rate for the attacker received CSI values can achieve
maximum while the packet loss rate for the normal network
service can achieve minimum. The mapped expressions of
min vector and max vector can be written as the following
two equations:
min vector
f(dN1 , channel) + ...+ f(dNi , channel) + ...+ f(dNn , channel)
(1)
max vector
f(dA1 , channel) + ...+ f(dAj , channel) + ...+ f(dAm , channel)
(2)
under the following constraints:
(i) Distance constraint:
max dAi ≤ Dneighbor ≤ dNi
(ii) Channel constraints:
packet loss rateCSI values ≥ δ
packet loss ratenormal QoS ≤ γ
Which dNi represents the distance between the safe
wireless transmitter and normal public wireless transmitters
while n represents the number of normal wireless
transmitters in the public place; dAj represents the distance
between the safe wireless transmitter and the target public
APs while m represents the number of target public APs;
Dneighbor represents the distance that the two wireless
transmitters can be neighbors, as shown in the definition of
neighbors in definition 1, the footnote in Page 2.
The distance constraint can be interpreted as follows: in
order to interfere the target public APs, the distance dAi
should be shorter than Dneighbor so that when they work
on adjacent channels, there will exist channel interference
between the safe wireless transmitter and the target public
APs. In order not to interfere the normal public wireless
transmitters, the distance dNj should be large thanDneighbor
so that even when they work on adjacent channels, there
will not exist channel interference between the safe wireless
transmitters and normal public wireless transmitters.
The interpretation of channel constraint is as follows: in
order to interfere the CSI values that the attacker received so
that the attacker can’t recover the gesture privacy, the packet
loss rate for CSI values need to be larger than the threshold δ;
in order not to effect the normal network service, the packet
loss rate of QoS should be smaller than the threshold γ.
CSI-based Localization for wireless transmitters
There are many methods to locate the public wireless
transmitters, for example, Wang et al.Wang et al. (2015)
propose an accurate localization method by using received
signal strength (RSS). However, RSS is related to the
transmit power of the APs, and the attacker may change
the transmit power to confuse the user to get the position
of the public wireless transmitters in the public place. Thus,
RSS-based localization method is not feasible in the public
place and CSI-based localization method is used to locate the
public wireless transmitters in this paper.
As mentioned above, a gesture can generate an unique
pattern in CSI values, however, different positions can also
generate different patterns in CSI values, thus, CSI can be
used to do localization for public wireless transmitters. As
shown in Figure 11a, the CSI values of the same position
are always the same at different periods of time, and the CSI
amplitude values in Figure 11a are from 8.6 to 10.6. We can
see from Figure 11a that the CSI values of different positions
are different and when two positions are near each other,
their CSI values are also similar; when the two positions are
far away from each other, their CSI values will be totally
different.
When CSI values are used to do localization for public
wireless transmitters, first we need to remove the noise from
obtained signals, then in order to reduce the computational
complexity, PCA is used to reduce the dimension of CSI
values, then the system will locate the public wireless
transmitters. The following will introduce the details.
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Figure 5. CSI values for different positions
Noise Removal using DWT
As mentioned in section , the obtained CSI values contain
much noise, so noise need to be removed from received CSI
values. In this paper, we apply a two-level discrete wavelet
packet decomposition and Symlets wavelet filter to remove
noise.
Dimension Reduction using PCA
What received in the receiver is a sequence of CSI values
and each CSI represents the amplitudes and phases on
group of subcarriers. For example, when the receiver is Intel
5300 NICs with NTX transmit antennas and NRX receiver
antennas, the CSI vales in the receiver end will be 30×
NTX ×NRX streams. Thus, when CSI values are used to
do localization, dimension of CSI values need to be reduced
in order to reduce the computational cost.
In this paper, the dimensionality of CSI values is reduced
by PCA, because PCA can recognize which subcarries show
the strongest correlation with the position, choose the most
representative components from all CSI time series and
remove the uncorrelated noisy components. The PCA-based
on CSI values dimension reduction includes the following
steps.
Processing:
A matrix H presents the CSI time-series data with 30×
NTX ×NRX streams that is after noise removal. Every
column of H represents the CSI data of each subcarrier, and
the column of H will be 30×NTX ×NRX . Then the mean
value of each column in H is calculate and the corresponding
mean values is subtracted in every column.
Correlation Calculation:
Correlation matrix Hc is calculated as the following
equation:HT ×H . After obtaining the correlation matrix,
then eigenvalues and eigenvectors of covariance will be also
calculated.
Main Eigenvalues Chosen:
Eigenvalues is sorted from large to small and we choose
the matrix k number of Eigenvalues. Then the corresponding
k Eigenvectors will form a Eigenvector matrix.
Location using DTW and SVM
As mentioned above, DTW is used to compare the
waveforms of different gestures, it can also be used to
compare the waveforms of different positions. In this paper,
DTW is used to localize the public wireless transmitters.
DTW calculates the distance between the waveforms of two
positions, and the shorter the distance is, the more similar the
two waveforms will be. We build a classifier to localize the
wireless transmitters based on their waveform shapes and the
DTW distances, and our classifier adopts SVM classification
scheme, which allows all the positions to be differentiated
based on the training dataset.
Packet Loss Rate Calculation
When channel interference is used to interfere the
attacker’s obtained CSI values, the essence is making
attacker lose ICMP ping packets. However, how many
packets the attacker lose so that the attacker can’t decode
the gestures privacy successfully? For public APs, in order
not to influence the network service for the normal users, the
packet loss rate for the network service should be less than a
threshold.
Packet Loss Rate (QOS)
For real-time applications, such as Internet telephony or
video conference, the quality of service (QoS) will degrade
when the packet loss is excessive Borella et al. (1998).
However, the real-time applications are not sensitive to
packet loss, and the packet loss rate of 1% ∼ 3% is
acceptable in most cases Zhao and Fan (2004).
In public places, people often surf the Internet, watch
online videos, online chat or play games using public WiFi,
so the packet loss rate of the network service for normal users
should be less than 3% and the network service for normal
users will not be affected.
Packet Loss Rate (CSI)
In order to obtain a high success rate of gesture privacy, the
attacker need to obtain fine-grained CSI time-series values.
In this part, we will discuss the influence of packet loss rate
on success rate. What the attacker received from his receiver
is a sequence of CSI values and the QualityCSI is measured
by packet loss rate. For gestures recovery, feature length
(the number of received packets after feature chosen) can
be a factor to differentiate different gestures. For example,
the feature lengths of simple unlock patterns and complex
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Figure 6. Influence of packet rate loss on success rate
unlock patterns on smart devices are usually different. If
the influenced signal traces that the attacker received is
not complete, the attacker will decode the complex unlock
patterns as simple unlock patterns.
However, if the packet loss rate is small and just lose
several packets, it will not influence the results of success
rate. However, if QualityCSI is large than a threshold, it will
influence the results of success rate greatly and the success
rate will decrease dramatically.
The attacker can use DTW method to quantify the
similarity of two influenced signal traces, the shorter the
distance that DTW calculated is, the more similar between
two influenced signal traces. In this part, the influence of
packet loss rate on calculated distance is considered instead
of calculating the recovery accuracy in order to give a bottom
view of success rate calculation.
The distance of CSI waveforms between 15 unlock
patterns on smart phones is calculated instead of calculating
the recovery accuracy of them directly, and the results are as
shown in Figure 6. We can see from Figure 6 that with the
increase of packet loss rate, the distances between 15 unlock
patterns becomes shorter, and the tested unlock pattern will
be more similar with the 15 unlock patterns. Then the
tested unlock patterns will be decoded for one of those 15
unlock patterns according to the calculated distances, and the
recovery accuracy will decrease.
Implementation
We implement WiGuard on current TP-Link wireless
routers in the corridor and in a room in indoor environment.
Experiments setup
The TP-Link wireless router and intelligent device
with wireless hotspot functions are wireless transmitters
respectively, and the desktop with Intel 5300 NIC (Network
Interface Controller) is used as a receiver. The work of the
transmitter follows the IEEE 802.11n protocol. The receiver
is deployed with 3 antennas, and the firmware reports CSI to
the upper layers. One end of the receiver continuously pings
packets, and the other end stores and processes the collected
packets. The collected packets are a sequence of data, each
packet contains the RSSI value of three antennas, the value
of noise, CSI and so on. Each CSI represents the phase and
amplitude on a set of 30 OFDM subcarriers.
Parameters for interference evaluation
After detecting the channel of public APs the target public
AP, then the safe wireless transmitter will switch to a proper
channel to interfere the target public APs. However, there
are several adjacent channels that can interfere the public
APs, which channel should the safe wireless transmitter
switch to make the channel interference between the safe
wireless transmitter and the target public APs maximum so
that the packet loss rate can achieve maximum. In this paper,
we will introduce four parameters to quantify the channel
interference between the secure wireless transmitter and the
target public APs, which are the number of packets received,
the packet loss rate, the interference strength Zhang et al.
(2012) and the active ratio Zhang et al. (2012), respectively.
The definition of the four parameters is as follows:
• The number of the received packets.
The parameters are obtained by actual experiments,
and what we have obtained is a sequence of CSIs,
and the length of the sequence is the number of the
received packets.
• Packet loss rate.
Packet Loss Rate =
RV of RP − IV of RP
RV of RP
(3)
In the above equation, RV of RP represents the
reference number of received packets, which the
packets are obtained when the safe wireless transmitter
and target public APs work on different channels and
there exist no channel interference between them¶. IV
of RP represents the interference number of received
packets, which the packets are obtained when the safe
wireless transmitter and the target public APs work on









In the above equation, RSSIi noise removal represents
the RSSI value of i− th packets that has been
removed noise, and RP represents the reference
number of the received packets. The value of IS
represents the interference strength between the safe
wireless transmitter and the target public AP, the value
of IS is greater, the interference strength between the









if |RSSIi+Noisei|RSSIi noise removal ≥ 1, Ui = 1
other, Ui = 0
(5)
¶We assume that when the safe wireless transmitter and the public APs that
the attacker leverages work on different channels and there exist no channel
interference between them, the packet loss rate is 0.
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Figure 7. Four parameters to characterize the channel interference under six conditions for the safe wireless transmitter and the
public AP that the attacker leverages
In the above equation, RSSIi represents the RSSI
value of i− th packets and Noisei represents the
noise value of i− th packets, the value of AR is
greater, the noise that contains in the received packets
is lower, and the channel interference between the safe
wireless transmitter and the target public APs will be
weaker.
Evaluation
In this section, we first prove that the channel interference
between two adjacent wireless transmitters is different when
the channel spacing between them is different , and lays
the foundation for channel switching, then we prove that
when the distance of two wireless transmitters is greater
than Dneighbor, between them there would be no channel
interference, finally we reproduce the experiments of WiPass
Zhang et al. (2016) and WiKey Ali et al. (2015), which
proves the channel interference can beat CSI-based attack.
Channel Interference on Public APs that
Attacker Leverages
In order to select a suitable channel to interfere with the
target public APs, it is necessary to carry out experiments
with different channel spacing between two wireless
transmitters. For some public APs, the simple co-channel
interference avoidance algorithm can be used to prove that
the channel interference can last enough time to ensure
gesture privacy operation completely done, and then do the
experiments of the last time of channel interference.
Channel
For public APs that can work in the same public place,
in order to avoid channel interference between them, they
always work on channel 1, channel 6 and channel 11. Thus,
there are six conditions of the channels for two neighbor
wireless transmitters, and in this part, the experiments of
these six conditions are done to demonstrate that when the
channel spacing between two neighbor wireless transmitters
is different, the channel interference between them will also
be different. In these experiments, the distance between the
two neighbor APs is 1m and the results are as shown in
Figure 7.
In Figure 7 the value “0” in X-axis means that there exists
no channel interference between two wireless transmitters,
the value “−2” and “2” means that the channel spacing
between two wireless transmitters is 2 ; the value “−1”
and “1” means the channel spacing between two wireless
transmitters is 1. “−” means that the channel of the target
public AP is less than the channel of the safe wireless
transmitter.
We can see from Figure 7 that the number of received
packets is the maximum when there exists no channel
interference between the two neighbor wireless transmitters.
The number of received packets is relatively low when
there exists channel interference between the two wireless
transmitters, and when the channel spacing between two
wireless transmitters is 1, the number of received packets
is the minimum and the packet loss rate is the maximum.
For example, in Figure 7a and Figure 7b, when the channel
of safe wireless transmitter is 1, the channel of the target
public AP is 6, if the safe wireless transmitter switches to
channel 5, the number of received packets is 319 and the
packet loss rate is 37.695%; if the safe wireless transmitter
switches to channel 7, the number of received packets is
277 and the packet loss rate is 45.894%; while if the safe
wireless transmitter switches to channel 4, the number of
received packets is 423 and the packet loss rate is 17.383%;
and if the safe wireless transmitter switches to channel 8, the
number of received packets is 382 and the packet loss rate is
25.392%. Thus, when the channel spacing between the safe
wireless transmitter and the target public AP is 1, the channel
interference between them can achieve the maximum.
We can see from Figure 7c and Figure 7d that when
there exists no channel interference between safe wireless
transmitter and the target public AP, the value of interference
strength is the minimum and the value of active ratio is the
maximum. When the safe wireless transmitter switches the
channel, the value of interference strength will increase and
the value of the active ratio will decrease. When channel
spacing between the safe wireless transmitter and the target
public AP is 1, the value of the interference strength is the
maximum and the value of active ratio is the minimum. That
is consistent with the analysis in section .
Therefore, when the channel spacing between the secure
wireless transmitter and the target public AP is 1, the
channel interference between them is maximum. Thus,users
can switch the secure wireless transmitter to the adjacent
channel, and make the channel spacing between the security
wireless transmitter and the target public AP be 1, so as to
interfere with the attacker.
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Figure 9. The parameters to characterize the channel
interference for different wireless transmitters
Time
For some wireless transmitters, a simple co-channel
interference avoidance algorithm may be adopted. When AP
detects channel interference, it will choose other suitable
channels for data transmission H3C (2016). In order to
demonstrate how long channel interference exists between
the secure wireless transmitter and the target public AP
after switching the channel of secure wireless transmitter so
that the users gesture privacy can be completed during the
interference time, we collected 90s data after switching the
channel of the safe wireless transmitter.
We can see from Figure 8a that under the six conditions,
the number of the fourth 10s received packets is the largest,
in Figure 8b, the difference for IS andAR values in different
periods is relatively small. So as time grows, the channel
interference between the secure wireless transmitter and
the target public AP will be weakened, however, after 90s,
the channel interference is still existed between the secure
wireless transmitter and the target public AP, and 90s is
enough to complete some gesture privacy. If the user does
the gesture privacy for a long time, the user can detect the
channel of the target public AP, and if the channel of target
public AP switches to another channel during the time when
gesture privacy is done, then the safe wireless transmitter
switches its channel accordingly.
Different wireless transmitters
The attacker can turn on the hotspot functionality of
his smart devices to serve as a public wireless transmitter,
and the smart devices is used as the transmitter to emit
wireless signals Zhang et al. (2016), thus whether the channel
interference is also appropriate for the different kinds of
wireless transmitters.
We can see from Figure 9 that for APs and smart devices,
the parameters that characterizes the channel interference
are different. The interference value of received packets and
packet loss rate of AP is more than that of smart devices,
for example, the packet loss rate of AP is 31.5%, the packet
loss rate of smart device is 27.2%. Besides, the value of
interference strength of AP is more than that of smart device,
the value of active ratio of AP is less than that of smart
device. Through the analysis about IS and AR in section
, we know that the influence of channel interference on
AP is stronger than that on smart devices. However, when
the attacker leverages smart phone to collect CSI data, the
channel interference protection method is also appropriate.
Channel Interference on Normal Public
Wireless Transmitters
When the secure wireless transmitter is far away from the
normal public APs, there is no channel interference between
the two. In order to choose an appropriate distance between
the secure wireless transmitter and the other public APs,
we carry out experiments on different distances, and on the
condition of that the channel spacing between the secure
wireless transmitter and the other normal public AP is 1.
From Figure 10a, we can see when the distance between
the secure wireless transmitter and other normal public
wireless AP is from 0.5m to 2m, the interference value of
the received packets and the reference value of the received
packets is almost the same, which is because the secure
wireless transmitter and the wireless transmitter of attacker
is close enough, even if there is no channel interference,
it will also affect the number of packets received. As the
distance between them increases, the influence of channel
interference will be weakened, and the number of packets
received will be increased. As can be seen from Figure 10a,
when the channel interference between the secure wireless
transmitter and the other normal public AP is more than 3m,
the channel interference between them will be weakened.
In Figure 10b, when the distance is less than 2m, IS is
high and AR is relatively low, when the distance is more
than 3m, IS decreases andAR increases sharply. So in order
not to interfere the other normal public APs, the distance
between the safe wireless transmitter and the other normal
public APs would be better when it is more than 4m.
Case Study
There are two kinds of gestures for CSI-based attack, and
we separately choose unlock patterns and keystrokes as the
representative gestures for consecutive gestures and discrete
gestures to do the experiments, and the results are as shown
in Figure 11. Uellenbeck et al.S et al. (2013) found that there
exist typical strategies for frequently used unlock patterns,
such as the top left corner is usually used as a starting
point and straight lines are more popular in their patterns.
According to it, 15 unlock passwords are randomly chosen
as the tested unlock passwords according to the habits of
people’s daily use, and the tested 15 unlock passwords are
shown in Figure 11c. Besides, numpad 0 to numpad 9 in the
right of the keyboard are chosen as the tested keystrokes, as
shown in Figure 11b.
The results of the recovery of the two case studies are
shown in Figure 12. From Figure 12c, we can see that
when there is no channel interference, the recovery accuracy
is relatively high, the average recovery accuracy of the
15 unlock password patterns is 82.33%, and the average
recovery accuracy of the 10 keypads is 92%, as shown in
Figure 12d. The results of unlock patterns and keyboard
recovery indicate that the wireless signal will reveal the
user’s privacy, which should be a warning for users.
From Figure 12, we can see that when the channel
interference exists, the recovery accuracy is relatively low,
and the average recovery accuracy of the 15 unlock password
patterns is 21.67%, the recovery results are shown in Figure
13; the average recovery accuracy of the 10 keypads is 42%,
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Figure 8. Four parameters to characterize the duration of channel interference under the six conditions for the safe wireless
transmitter and the other normal public APs
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Figure 10. Four parameters under different distances










P a t t e r n
 S u c c e s s f u l  r e c o g n i t i o n     F a i l e d  r e c o g n i t i o n
(a) Pattern recognition without
interference
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(b) Pattern recognition with
channel interference
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  S u c c e s s f u l  r e c o g n i t i o n     F a i l e d  r e c o g n i t i o n
(c) Keyboards recognition
without interference










T h e  v a l u e  o f  p r e s s e d  k e y
 S u c c e s s f u l  r e c o g n i t i o n     F a i l e d  r e c o g n i t i o n
(d) Keyboards recognition with
channel interference
Figure 12. Users’ behavior recognition when there exists no channel interference and channel interference
and the recovery results of keypads for 20 times are shown
in Figure 14. Compared with the recovery accuracy without
channel interference, the recovery accuracy of the presence
of channel interference is significantly reduced. The results
show that the channel interference can effectively defeat CSI-
based attacker effectively.
Channel Interference on the Network Service
If the target public AP is disturbed, the network services
that ordinary users have accessed will also be disturbed.
Watching online programs is to test the impact of channel
interference on network services. As can be seen from
Figure 15, when users are watching the online program with
the target public AP, after the secure wireless transmitter
switches the channel, the network service can also be very
good, and the video is also very smooth. Therefore, the
impact of channel interference on network services is very
small, and users can also have a normal network service.
Related Work
Previous researches mainly focus on two kinds of channel
interference, one is interference between different communi-
cation systems, and the other is channel interference between
802.11 communication systems.
Interference between 802.11 networks and
other networks that works on 2.4GHz
ISM (Industrial Scientific Medical) 2.4 GHz is an
open frequency band worldwide and many communication
systems work on it, such as ZigBee, WiFi, Bluetooth and
wireless USB. With the development of short-range wireless
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(c) 15 tested unlock passwords for Android unlock patterns





























































































































































































































































Figure 13. Recognition accuracy of unlock pattern when there
exist channel interference.
Typed keystrokes: 0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9
Inferred keystrokes: 1   1   1   3   3   4   4   2   9   9       
 1   1   7   3   4   5   0   2   8   9       
1   7   2   3   4   5   7   3   8   9       
7   2   2   1   4   4   5   2   9   8       
7   1   2   3   3   7   3   4   9   9      
0   1   1   2   4   0   6   1   8   9      
2   1   2   4   4   6   2   5   8   9       
0   1   2   4   3   2   6   5   9   9       
0   1   2   5   4   0   2   6   8   9       
0   1   2   4   4   4   7   7   9   8      
 0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9
0   0   3   3   2   0   4   0   8   9       
1   1   2   6   4   5   5   7   8   8      
5   0   4   3   4   6   4   5   9   9       
6   1   2   4   4   5   3   1   8   8       
5   0   6   4   3   5   2   6   8   8       
0   2   0   6   5   0   7   7   9   8     
2   0   0   4   6   2   7   4   8   9       
0   0   2   4   7   6   5   1   8   8       
5   0   1   4   4   7   5   7   8   8       
0   1   0   4   6   5   6   7   9   9     
Figure 14. Recognition accuracy of keystrokes when there
exist channel interference.


























no adjacent channel interference
adjacnet channel interference
Figure 15. Evaluation on good AP
communication systems in recent years, more and more
systems work on 2.4GHz. However, the frequency band of
2.4GHz is limited, and that will lead to the interference
between different communication systems. The interference
problem will be increasingly serious and inevitable with an
increasing number of short-range wireless communication
systems.
According to Xu et al. (2011), previous researches have
been classified into the following three categories:
• Interference mechanism/Interference principle.
Some researches focused on the interference mecha-
nism/interference principle try to analyze the possi-
ble causes of interference appeared between different
communication systems. For example, Yuan et al.
Yuan et al. (2007) divided the interference between
WiFi and ZigBee into four cases, and analyze whether
there is channel interference in these four cases. The
study of interference mechanism/interference princi-
ple will lay the foundation for the following two types
of researches.
• Interference avoidance.
The scheduling problem of spectrum resources is the
essence of interference avoidance, in which the core
problem is how to allocate the spectrum resources
in different communication systems to transmit data.
Tytgat et al. Tytgat et al. (2015) and Shi et al. Shi
et al. (2015) achieve interference avoidance between
WiFi and ZigBee communication systems. Lee et al.
Lee et al. (2012) propose collaborative approach and
non-collaborative approach to solve the interference
avoidance.
• Interference coexistence.
When the spectrum resources are fully used, there
must be interference. How to make different commu-
nications and interference coexist is a challenge. The
study Yan et al. (2015) achieves the coexistence of
interference between WiFi and ZigBee, and Almeida
et al. Almeida et al. (2013) achieves the coexistence of
interference between WiFi and LTE.
Channel Interference in 802.11 networks
Two types of interference in the 802.11 network has been
proposed by Villegas et al. Villegas et al. (2007), one is the
co-channel interference, which is caused by the transmission
on the same frequency channel; another is the adjacent
channel interference, which is caused by the transmission on
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the adjacent channels or overlapped channels. Zubow et al.
Zubow and Sombrutzki (2012) analyze the adverse effects of
adjacent channel interference in the 802.11 networks. Tan et
al. Tan et al. (2010) evaluate the effects of adjacent channel
interference through extensive experiments. Previous studies
on channel interference in 802.11 networks mainly focus
on how to allocate channels for these WiFi nodes to
avoid co channel interference, and how to prove adjacent
channel interference to assist the radio resources of different
management mechanisms. Unlike previous work considered
unfavourable to channel interference, this paper uses channel
interference to defeat CSI-based attack.
Conclusion
This paper presents a new method to break the CSI -
based attack, called WiGuard, which uses public WiFi to
obtain user’s gesture privacy. Our idea of design is that if
we can interfere with the attacker’s wireless transmitter to
distort the CSI signal, then the attacker will not be able
to successfully restore gesture privacy. In order to distort
the CSI signal, WiGuard uses the realization possibility
of channel interference to defeat the attacker. WiGuard
first detects the channel of the target public AP using
the number of ICMP ping packets because in order to
obtain the fine-grained CSI values to recover gesture privacy,
the attacker need to ping the target public AP at a high
rate. After detecting the channel, the user can switch a
safe wireless transmitter to a proper channel to interfere
the attacker. Extensive experiments demonstrate that when
the channel spcing of safe wireless transmitter the target
public AP is 1, the channel interference between them
can achieve maximum, and the user can switch the safe
wireless transmitter to that channel. When the distance
between the safe wireless transmitter and the other normal
public APs is more than 4m, channel interference between
them becomes weak, and Dneighbor can be seen as 4m,
so when the distance between them is more than 4m,
the channel switch of the safe wireless transmitter will
not influence the other normal public APs. Evaluation on
network service demonstrate that channel interference will
not influence the normal network service. Unlock passwords
and keyboards recovery experiments show that when there
exists channel interference, the recovery accuracy decrease
dramatically, thus, our system WiGuard is effective and
channel interference can be used to defeat CSI-based attack.
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